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EXPERIMENT 1
where the weight of a path, W(P) , is
equal to the r1h root of the sum of the
r-power weights along the k links of the
path, Wi' When r = 00, the equation is
appropriate for ordinal data, and the re-
sultant network contains the minimal
number of links required to maintain or-
dinal information (Hutchinson, 1989;
Schvaneveldt, Dearholt, & Durso, 1988).
Basically, we wanted to compare the
graphs of people who had experienced
the insight with the graphs ofgroups who
did not. To this end, subjects made re-
latedness judgments of pairs of concepts
at the end of the experimental session. In
none of the conditions described below
was the judgment task responsible for
producing the insight.
To increase the occurrence ofinsights
among the subjects in our laboratory, we
used a puzzle that required the subject to
perception based on pair-wise similarity
or dissimilarity ratings. Empirically de-
rived graphs have been used successfully
in distinguishing novices and experts
(Schvaneveldt et aI., 1985), in predicting
the order of remembered information
(Cooke, Durso, & Schvaneveldt, 1986),
in predicting the usability of menus
(Roske-Hofstrand & Paap, 1986), in dis-
criminating the structure of categories
(Hutchinson, 1989; Schvaneveldt et aI.,
1989), in accounting for the latency to
categorize (Cooke, 1992), and in describ-
ing the flow of information within a city
(Durso & Coggins, 1990).
Pathfinder uses the Minkowski r dis-
tance (Equation I) to satisfy the require-
ments of a path algebra (Carre, 1979) for
networks and to compute the geodesic
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tion before the solution was available.
This contention has been rightfully criti-
cized (Dominowski, 1981; Weisberg &
Alba, 1981a, 1981b) because an indepen-
dent measure of fixation does not exist.
In fact, a similar argument can be leveled
against the ~xplanatory power ofrestruc-
turing, because an independent measure
of restructuring does not exist.
It has proven difficult to disentangle
empirically the cognitive structure of a
problem from the actual discovery of a
solution. Gestaltists used subjects' pro-
tocols as one method (Wertheimer,
1959). However, subjects' self-reports
about the probability of discovering a so-
lution have been demonstrated to be un-
related to actual insight (Metcalfe,
1986a), suggesting that self-reports fol-
lowing insight are equally unreliable.
What is required is a measure of cogni-
tive structure that can be used whether
or not a solution to the problem has been
achieved. Without such a measure, in-
sight and restructuring are circular, and
insight remains simply a term to describe
the phenomenology that accompanies
some successful problem solutions.
Psychological scaling provides a pro-
cedure that can address the role of re-
structuring as the mechanism underlying
insight. The Pathfinder scaling algorithm
(Schvaneveldt, Durso, & Dearholt, 1989)
is one method of revealing the latent
structure of the problem representation.
Pathfinder uses judgments of similarity
between concepts to produce a graph.
Graphs have proven important in the un-
derstanding of chemical isomers, electri-
cal circuits, Markov chains, statistical
mechanics, and network flow in opera-
tional research (Harary, 1969). Path-
finder creates graphs from noisy empiri-
cal data by determining and eliminating
those relations in the data that violate the
assumption of triangle inequality, thus
revealing the latent structure of the con-
ceptual domain. The technique does not
require subjects to report on their per-
ception of the problem as a whole but
instead produces a representation of that
On occasion, the solution to a prob-
lem appears to arrive in a rapid and
unexpected manner (Grmek, 1980; Weis-
burd, 1987). Gestalt psychologists be-
lieved that restructuring of the problem
situation was a necessary prerequisite
for successful problem solving, and that
when this restructuring occurred rapidly,
the subject experienced insight (Ellen,
1982; Luchins & Luchins, 1970;
Scheerer, 1963; Wertheimer, 1959). To
gestaltists, restructuring affected the en-
tire problem situation; the problem was,
in their words, recentered (Wertheimer,
1959). The focus of the problem struc-
ture changed because the perceived re-
lations among the elements had changed
(Ohlsson, 1984). Gestaltists argued that
the restructuring was rapid because the
problem solver had to overcome a fixa-
Address correspondence to Francis T.
Durso, Depanment of Psychology, Univer-
sity of Oklahoma, Norman, OK 73019-0535;
e-mail: am1067@uokmvsa.bitnet.
Abstract-The ''flash of insight" some-
times observed in problem solving and in
scientific discovery has been thought to
be due to a sudden cognitive restructur-
ing ofthe problem sitllation. Direct con-
firmation ofrestructllring has been diffi-
cult without an independellt procedure
for determining cognitive structure.
Graph structures were derived from
judgmellts of concept relatedness made
by subjects who had an insight and by
several groups who either did not or
could not have the insight. The graphs of
the solvers differed from the graphs of
subjects who tried and failed, those who
listened to the solvers, and those who
were given the solution. When other
subjects in a subsequent experiment re-
peatedly judged similarity of pairs of
concepts, there was evidence that those
connections critical to the new cognitive
order were targeted long before there
was the breathtaking cognitive reorgani-
zation.
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To control for the possibility that struc-
tural differences between solvers and
nonsolvers might be due to differences in
the questions asked, listeners attempted,
but failed, to solve the puzzle after lis-
tening to the tapes of the solvers' ques-
tions up to but not including the final
(i.e., solution) question. To control for
the possibility that knowledge of the so-
lution (i.e., hiccoughs) produced differ-
ences that were not due to discovering
the solution, one group (hiccough narra-
tive) was read the story except that the
story began with "A man with the hic-
coughs walks ..."; thus, subjects in
Comparing Other Groups With
Solvers and Nonsolvers
Nonsolvers
To investigate some of the underlying
reasons why solvers and nonsolvers
might differ in their cognitive structure
of the problem, five additional groups of
6 subjects each were given different in-
formation prior to judging relatedness.
explicit in the story (man, bartender).
People who solved the insight puzzle dif-
fered dramatically from those who ac-
tively tried to solve the puzzle but failed.
Fig. 1. Pathfinder graphs of concept associations for solvers (top) and nonsolvers
(bottom). The center of each graph (indicated by a bold outline) is the node with
minimum eccentricity, and the median node (indicated by shading) has the smallest
average distance to all other nodes.
Solvers Compared
With Nonsolvers
Solvers (n = 6) were those subjects
who succeeded in solving the puzzle.
Nonsolvers (n = 6) were those who
failed to solve the puzzle after 2 hr of
questioning. Subjects made their repre-
sentations of the problem available by
providing relatedness judgments on a 10-
point Likert scale for the 91 possible
pairings of 14 terms relevant to the puz-
zle. Some of the terms were explicit in
the puzzle (e.g., man, bartender), some
were relevant to the solution (e.g., sur-
prise, remedy), and some were merely
objects found in a bar (e.g., TV, pret-
zels). The pairs were presented ran-
domly to the subjects, and positions of
members within a pair were counterbal-
anced.
Within each group (solvers and non-
solvers), the mean rating for each pair of
terms was computed. This 14 x 14 ma-
trix of mean ratings was then submitted
to the Pathfinder algorithm. Resultant
graphs appear in Figure I. Graph dis-
tances (number of links) between all pos-
sible pairs of nodes were computed for
each graph. The solvers and nonsolvers
Were distinctly different: The correlation
between the respective graph-distance
matrices was essentially zero (r = .00).
Measures of the focal point of each graph
(i.e., center and median) were also com-
puted. In the solvers' graph, remedy and
relieved occupy a central position. The
nonsolvers' graph centers on concepts
induce a missing piece of information:
"A man walks into a bar and asks for a
glass of water. The bartender points a
shotgun at the man. The man says,
'Thank you,' and walks oui." Earlier
work using this puzzle (Dayton, Durso,
& Shepard, 1990) indicated that when
people finally find the missing piece of
information necessary to make sense of
the story, the solution arrives with a sud-
denness and accompanying phenomenol-
ogy (Metcalfe, 1986a, 1986b; Metcalfe &
Wiebe, 1987) that is characteristic of in-
sight (Wertheimer, 1959).
Subjects asked the experimenter yes-
or-no questions to gain more information
about the puzzle (e.g., "Was the man
thirsty?" "No."). The questions and the
experimenter's responses were tape-
recorded.
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Table 1. Pearson product-moment correlations between the
graph-distance matrices offive groups and the solvers' and
nonsolvers' graph·distance matrices
Group Solver Nonsolver More like?
Naive .09 .15 Neither
Story only .27* .39* Both
Listeners -.02 .68* Nonsolvero
Hiccough narrative -.04 .23* Nonsolvero
Solution given .13 .38* Nonsolver+
Note. The larger the positive correlation, the closer in a 91·d
representational space are the two graphs. The more similar target
group (solvers or nonsolvers) is indicated in the rightmost column.
* Correlation is significantly different from 0 at an alpha level of .05.
0.+ The two correlations are reliably (p < .05)0 or marginally (p <
.10)+ different using the Pearson r-to-z transform in a test for
differences between correlated correlation coefficients (Meng,
Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992).
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2, we were interested
in determining how critical pairs of con-
cepts, as identified by the graphs in Ex-
periment I, changed within a subject as
the subject heard, attempted to solve,
and ultimately solved the puzzle. Thus,
unlike in Experiment I, we asked sub-
jects to judge pairs repeatedly. Specifi-
cally, all subjects judged the pairs before
they heard the puzzle (naive), after they
heard the puzzle (story), after they
solved the puzzle (solved), and every 10
min between hearing the story and solv-
ing the puzzle.
Rather than have subjects repeatedly
judge all 91 pairs from Experiment I, we
selected pairs that, according to the
graphs, should behave differently as sub-
jects move from hearing the puzzle to
solving it. These insight pairs were sur-
prise-remedy and relieved-thank you,
the only two pairs that were unique to
the solvers' graph. How perception of
similarity varies across time for these
pairs was of critical concern. We ex-
pected that they would initially be
viewed as unrelated and ultimately be
viewed as related. However, how these
pairs made this transition would supply
information about how the restructuring
of the cognitive structure proceeds. In
addition to insight pairs, subjects judged
two related pairs and two unrelated
pairs. The related pairs (Le., bartender-
bar; shotgun-loaded) were connected in
all the Pathfinder graphs of Experiment
I, and the unrelated pairs (Le., pretzel-
shotgun; TV-remedy) were never linked
in the Pathfinder graphs. We expected
the related pairs to be judged as similar
regardless of the distance from solution,
and the unrelated pairs to be judged as
dissimilar at each opportunity. Finally,
we added 6 filler pairs (Le., water-thank
you, surprise-paper bag, friendly-thank
you, surprise-relieved, paper bag-
remedy, surprise-thank yOIl), bringing
the total number of pairs judged at each
opportunity to 12. The fillers were pairs
that did not meet the criteria of the
hints, have also been shown to be only
partially effective (Dominowski & Jen-
rick, 1972). Apparently, one cannot eas-
ily share in the insight of a colleague,
only in the results.
of the graph-theoretic centers for these
five additional groups resemble the solv-
ers' center (see Fig. 2). Thus, the struc-
ture of subjects who listened to the solv-
ers but did not hear the solution did not
resemble the structure of the solvers. If
subjects were told about hiccoughs, but
did not try to solve the puzzle, their
structure was nonetheless more similar
to the structure of the nonsolvers than of
the solvers. Apparently, having the solu-
tion available was not sufficient to yield
a structure that resembled that of the
solvers. Finally, even when subjects at-
tempted to solve the puzzle and were
given the solution, their graph was more
similar to the nonsolvers' than the solv-
ers'.
Only in the solvers' graph are all the
remedies for hiccoughs (Le., paper bag,
surprise, glass of water) connected to
the remedy node. The connection be-
tween surprise and remedy (the key to
the solution) and the connection between
thank you and relieved (the reason the
man said "thank you") are unique to the
solvers' graph. Even for subjects given
the solution, surprise is not connected to
remedy, suggesting these subjects did
not truly appreciate the solution in the
same sense as those who solved the puz-
zle on their own.
When the solution is handed to an ac-
tive problem solver, it appears to lack
the recentering power that a generated
solution possesses. Other methods of
passing on solutions, such as giving
this group were presented with a simple
narrative containing the solution, but
they were not told that the story was a
puzzle, nor were they asked to solve it.
To determine if the process of arriving at
the solution was important to the solv-
ers' structure, another group attempted
to solve the puzzle. After to min, but
before anyone could solve the puzzle,
we gave these subjects the solution. This
solution-given group thus was provided
with the story, an active problem-solving
experience, and the solution, but unlike
the solvers, they did not generate the so·
lution on their own. It is of interest that
these subjects exhibited the "aha!" phe-
nomenology associated with' insight
(Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987). Finally, two
baseline control groups were included:
The naive group simply gave relatedness
judgments without hearing the story, and
the story-only group read the original
puzzle and then immediately judged re-
latedness without attempting to solve the
puzzle first.
Table I presents correlations between
each graph-distance matrix and the solv-
ers' and nonsolvers' graph-distance
matrices. Both the solvers and the non-
solvers had structures different from the
preexperimental organization of the na-
ive group; and the structures of both the
solvers and the nonsolvers had similari-
ties with those subjects who heard only
the story. However, in every other case,
the graph did not correlate with the solv-
ers' graph (see Table I). Neither did any
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varied. However, al1 subjects made at
least two sets of judgments between
hearing the story and solving the puzzle:
one before solving (solved-I) and one 10
min before that (solved-2). A multivari-
ate analysis of variance confirmed that
ratings depended on the interaction of
phase and type of pair, F(6, 4) = 11.71,
p < .05. As expected, the related pairs
were viewed as similar throughout; the
unrelated pairs were viewed as dissimilar
throughout. Of most interest is the pat-
tern exhibited by the insight pairs. These
pairs did not leap directly from their ini-
tial dissimilar position to their ultimate
similar position. Rather, the pairs that
Pathfinder identified as unique to the
Stay Solved-2 Solved-1 Solved
GENERAL DISCUSSION
40
Fig. 3. Transitions in judged dissimilar-
ity as a function of the subject's phase in
the problem-solving process for concept
pairs that were linked in Experiment 1 in
al1 Pathfinder graphs (related), in no
Pathfinder graphs (unrelated), or in only
the solvers' Pathfinder graph (insight).
Naive = before hearing the puzzle; story
= after hearing the puzzle; solved-2 =
10 min before solved-I; solved-l = be-
fore solving the puzzle; solved = after
solving the puzzle. The amount of time
between the story condition and the
solved-2 condition depended o"n the
amount of time the subject took to solve
the puzzle.
Experiment 1 suggests a dramatic re-
structuring that requires more than just
access to the solution and attempts to
solve. Experiment 2 suggests that people
gradual1y identify possible relationships
on which to focus. Although these are
not judged as clearly related until later
(when the problem is solved), subjects
do view them as more related than most
other pairs. Other investigators (e.g.,
solvers moved first to an intermediate
level of similarity, t(9) = 2.55, P < .05,
and then to a final, high level of similar-
ity, t(9) = 3.41, p < .01. This move to an
intermediate level could not be attrib-
uted to an averaging across subjects who
moved catastrophically at different
points in time. The changes apparent in
the figure were confirmed by both para-
metric tests and sign tests. Eight of 10
subjects showed the change in similarity
between story and solved-2judgments (p
= .055), and al1 but 1 showed a drop
between solved-l and solved judgments
(P = .011), indicating that the pattern
was not due to only a few individuals.
Fig. 2. Pathfinder graphs of concept associations for the control conditions: solution-
given, hiccough narrative, naive, story-only, and listener groups. The bold nodes are
centers; the shaded nodes are medians.
other pairs, but that we felt would help
disguise the relationship of the pairs and
the puzzle's solution. Pairs were pre-
sented in a random order with the con-
straint that the related, unrelated, and in-
sight pairs were not in adjacent posi-
tions. Subjects judged the relatedness of
pairs by placing a slash through a 5 t/z-in.
line representing a scale of relatedness
divided into Vs-in. units. Measurement
was made by determining the position of
the slash.
Figure 3 shows how judgments for
each of the groups changed across time.
Because subjects took different amounts
of time to solve the puzzle, the number
of similarity judgment tasks performed
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have also demonstrated that explicitly
identifiable solutions may be preceded
by an above-chance forced choice of the
stimulus set relevant to the solution.
This report breaks the circularity be-
tween insight and restructuring and pro-
vides empirical evidence of the cognitive
reorganization underlying insight. Those
subjects who ultimately achieved the in-
sight clearly restructured the problem to
the point that elements stood in a differ-
ent relation to one another. In current
models of cognition, a massive reorgani-
zation and recentering can take place by
the importation of some higher order ab-
straction or schema into the comprehen-
sion situation. Together with the goals of
the situation, such importation can have
dramatic effects on cognitive processing
(Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Ohlsson,
1984; Smith, Adams, & Schorr, 1978).
Data from our second experiment, how-
ever, provided evidence of movement
toward this restructuring prior to solu-
tion. The presumed importation of a
higher order abstraction does not appear
to arrive without some warnings, al-
though the warnings are apparently in-
sufficient to produce a dramatic restruc-
turing and may be beneath the ken of the
solver (Metcalfe, 1986a, 1986b). Like dy-
namite, the insightful solution explodes
on the solver's cognitive landscape with
breathtaking suddenness, but if one
looks closely, a long fuse warns of the
impending reorganization.
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